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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS 
CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS-DUTY TO STOP AT STATION TO P.ER:MIT PAS-
SENGER To ALIGHT-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PASSENGER.-Plaintiff's 
intestate was riding in the front end of a crowded vestibule car in the coach 
next to the tender of the engine. When the train stopped at his station he 
tried to leave by the front end, but found the door from the vestibule closed. 
As he did not know how to open it, or was unwilling to be carried by his 
station, he stepped from his platform to the bumper of the tender and tried 
to follow it to the side ancL alight from it. Before he could do so the engine 
started with a lurch, he was thrown down and killed. The evidence strongly 
tended to prove that he would have escaped serious injury if the engineer 
had understood and heeded the cries and signals given by fellow passengers. 
Held, for the jury to say whether so leaving the train under unusual cir-
cumstances was contributory negligence on the part of the passenger. Don-
nally v. Payne (W. Va., 1921), 109 S. E. 76o. 
The court recognizes that for a passenger under ordinary circumstances 
to make a hazardous attempt to alight because the train does not stop at 
his station long enough to permit his leaving the train by the usual exits is 
in law contributory negligence, barring recovery. But peculiar circumstances 
may take the case out of the rule. The cases are very fully considered in 
Filer v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 47. a leading case. Generally, courts 
regard alighting from a moving train as negligence per se, unless the car-
rier puts the passenger in the position of risking one danger in order to 
avoid another. Pa. R. Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. St. 147. The act of the passen-
ger in such case is treated as the proximate, and the failure to stop the train 
as the remo'te, cause of the injury. Jammisoii v. C. & 0. Ry. Co., 92 Va. 
327. Some courts say that by jumping from a moving train one ceases to· 
be a passenger. Com. v. B. & M. R. Co., 129 Mass. 500. This may be a 
question for the jury. Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Hawley (Tex. Civ. 
App., 1921), 235 S. W;. 659. In any view the instant case is at the very 
limit in holding that the carrier may be liable to one leaving the train in 
such a manner, and it is not strange that Miller, J., vigorously dissented 
from the decision. There was some evidence on which the jury might have 
had instructions as to the last clear chance, but the court does not pass upon 
that. Contributory negligence in such cases is not always a matter of law, 
but is to be tested by what the ordinarily prudent person would do under 
all the circumstances of the case. If reasonable men can differ, then it is 
for the jury. Pa. R. Co. v. Kilgore, 32 Pa. St. 292; Louisville' & N. R. Co. 
v. Crttitk, II9 Ind. 542. But cf. Solomon v. Ry., 103 N. Y. 437. 
CoNSTITuTIONAI. LAW-APPLICATION oF GUARANTY oF FREF:noM oF SPEECH 
TO AI.IENS.-Information charging defendant, an alien, with violation of a 
statute of Connecticut penalizing seditious publications. Demurrer based 
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upon the Connecticut Bill of Rights, of which Section 5 reads: "Every citizen 
may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being 
responsible for the abuse of that liberty," and Section 6: "No law shall 
ever be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech or of the press." 
Held, demurrer overruled for two reasons: first, that aliens "do not possess 
the right of attempting to alter our form of government, and for that rea• 
son are not qualified to plead the privilege of unlimited political discussion," 
on which the provisions of the Bill of Rights are founded; and second, that 
the language of Section 6, above quoted, "plainly refers to the liberty of 
speech conferred by Section 5 upon citizens" alone, and hence is not appli• 
cable to aliens. State v. Sinclmk (Conn., 1921), 115 Atl. 33. 
It is impossible to determine from the decision which of the two above 
reasons was the controlling one in the mind of the court. If the latter, 
there is some justification for the result; but if the former, a new and start-
ling construction of the freedom of speech clause has received the sanction 
of judicial decision. There is no historical justification for restricting the 
clause until it is a mere concomitant of the right to "alter our form of gov-
ernment." On the contrary, one of the earliest objects of guaranties of 
freedom of speech, both in England and in this country, was the protection 
of discussion of religious matters. "FREEDOM OF 'l'HE PRESS IN MASSACHU-
SF:!'rs:' by Duniway, Chapters I to VI. In an address by the Continental 
Congress to the inhabitants of Quebec in 1774 the right of freedom of 
speech was broadly characterized as consisting, "besides the advancement 
of truth, science, morality and the arts in general, in the diffusion of liberal 
sentiment in the administration of government, the ready communication of 
thoughts between subjects, and the consequential promotion of union among 
them!." JouRNAL oF 'l'HE CoN'l'INEN'l'AL CONGRESS, Vol. I (Ed. 18oo), p. 57. 
Cooley, in his "CoNS'l'l'.l'U'l'IONAL Lrn1'l'A'l'I0Ns," Ed. 7, p. 6o4 after sketching 
the history of the right of freedom of speech, refers to the constitutional 
guaranties, and says: "Their purpose has evidently been to protect parties 
in free publication of matters of public concern, to secure their rights to a 
free discussion of public events and public measures, and to enable any 
citize1i at any time to bring the government and any person in authority to 
the bar of public opinion by any just criticism upon their conduct." These 
views indicate a far broader historical basis for freedom of speech than that 
conceded by the Connecticut court. Nor has the doctrine of the principal 
case ever been asserted in previous judicial utterances. If it were sound, 
it is not unreasonable to suppose that it would have been brought to light, 
especially in the host of recent cases involving the Espionage Acts of 1917. 
In several of these cases the defendants were aliens. Abrams v. U. S., 250 
U. S. 616. Furthermore, both the due process and the equal protection 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution should 
protect the alien from discriminatory action because of his alienage by a 
state. That these clauses apply to aliens as well as to citizens is well settled. 
State v. Montgomery, 94 Me. 192; Yick Wo v. Hopki1is, 118 U. S. 356. It 
is true that the state, in the exercise of its police power, may make reason-
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able classifications of persons and 'impose restrictions upon them. For 
instance, aliens as a class may be prohibited from entering the liquor busi-
ness. Trageser v. Gray, 73 Md. 250. But the classification must bear some 
reasonable relation to the evil which it is sought to prevent, and it is doubt-
ful if alien anarchistic propaganda is more dangerous than that of citizens. 
At any rate, it is for the legislature and not for the court to adopt the 
classification. It is entirely possible that the defendant in the principal case 
deserved the punishment he received, but the reasoning by which the court 
disposed of the case is questionable, to say the least. 
CONSTITUTIONAi, LA.W-INCOJII£ TAX ON SALARIES OF Fl>DERAI. JUDG£S.-
Plaintiff, a United States district judge, paid an income tax under the pro-
vision of Sec. 2I3 of the Income Tax Act, on his judicial salary, under pro-
test, and sued the deputy collector for the return of the tax. The United 
States Constitution, Art. 3, Sec. I, provides that compensation of judges of 
the supreme and inferior courts "shall not be diminished during their con-
tinuance in office." Held, such a tax violates this constitutional provision. 
(Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting.) Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245. 
In reversing the federal court;, 262 Fed. 550, the majority opinion points 
out that the purpose of this provision is to prevent the legislative depart-
ment from influenclng in any way the judiciary, and says that the public 
interest demands that the judge be kept even above the suspicion of outside 
influence. The tax does give the legislature power indirectly over the judi-
cial department, and hence is invalid. The Sixteenth Amendment does not 
extend the taxing power to new or excepted subjects, but merely removes 
all occasion othenvise existing for an apportionment among the states of 
taxes laid on income, whether derived from one source or another, and 
hence does not extend to federal judges nor permit Congress to impose an 
income tax on them. Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion reasons that 
the case is not within the scope of the provision, as the tax is laid on all 
persons having such amounts of income, and that at all events the Sixteenth 
Amendment gave such power to tax. The decision of the district court was 
commented upon favorably in I8 MICH. L. REv. 697. See also Note, II A. 
L. R. 532, 19 MICH. L. REv. II7; 34 HARV. L. REY. 70. The court in declar-
ing that the judiciary must be, like Caesar's wife, "above suspicion," go a 
long way in their interpretation of the purpose and intent behind the con-
stitutional provision, and unduly anticipate the alarming dangers which they 
so eloquently picture. The purpose of the provision is to protect the inde-
pendence of the judiciary. Does the law give the legislature power to injure 
the judge without likewise injuring every other person in the same classifi-
cation regarding income? It would seem not. Have the judges or any one 
of them been put into a class whereby the legislature may tyrannize over 
them? Not as yet, and if the time should come when such was attempted 
the judiciary will undoubtedly have the opportunity to say that such a classi-
fication is unreasonable and an arbitrary discrimination. Certainly, it requires 
quite a· stretch of the imagination to conjure up the spectre of legislative 
discrimination which was so real to the Supreme Court. 
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CoNTRACl's-R:esTRAINT oF 1'RADE-E111PLOYEE's CONTRACT TO ~IN 
FROM COMPE'l'ITlON.-In a contract of employment made with complainant 
defendant promised that he would not at any time, either during or subse-
quent to such employment, give out any information regarding the plant or 
processes of complainant, and would not do anything which might injure, 
by competition or otherwise, the complainant, its successors or assigns, in 
its business. In a bill for an injunction to restrain defendant from carrying 
on a similar business in another town, subsequent to the term of employment 
with complainant, lteld, denying an injunction, that the contract was void 
as in restraint of trade, in the absence of proof that the employer was pos-
sessed of a trade secret. Victor Chemical Works v. Iliff (Ill., I92I), 132 
N. E. 8o6. 
There is apparently a growing tendency to regard contracts of employ-
ment in partial restraint of trade with disfavor, and at least to refuse injunc-
tions, unless the scope of the contract is clearly no greater than necessary: 
for the protection of the promissee's rights. Hepworth Mfg. Co. v. Ryott, 
L. R. [1920], l Ch. l, 18 MICH. L. Rev. 795. The decision in the instant 
case is placed on the ground that the restraint was unlimited as to time and 
place, and that the proof does not show that complainant had any trade 
secret The terms of the contract hardly seem to justify this broad state-
ment. Defendant might set up a similar business in a location where he 
would not injure or compete with complainant. Reasonable territorial limits 
might have been implied from this fact, as well as a time limit co-extensive 
with the existence of the complainant's business. Such an interpretation 
would not be lacking in precedent in the case of the sale of good will with 
a business, Wooten v. Harris, 153 N. C. 43; Morgan v. Perhamus, 36 Ohio 
St. 517; Prame v. Ferrell, 166 Fed. 702; although in this class of cases lim-
itations as to both time and place are unnecessary, according to the modern 
view. if the agreement is reasonable in other respects and does not unduly 
conflict with the public interest. "The rule, broadly stated, is that no con-
tract of this kind is void as being in restraint of trade where it operates sim-
ply to prevent a party from engaging or competing in the same business." 
Southworth v. Davison, 100 Minn. n9. The instant case, however, does not 
consider the implied limitations as to time and space nor the analogy between 
the two classes of cases. 
CoRPORATlONS-LEASE TO CORPORATION NOT TERMINATED BY DISSOLUTION. 
-D represented the stockholders of a dissolved corporation which had been 
the lessee for years. After accepting rentals from D subsequent to the dis-
solution the lessor made a new lease of the premises to P for an increased 
rental. In arbitration proceedings to try title, lteld, D was entitled to the 
difference in rentals as trustee for the stockholders. Cmnmington Realty 
Associates v. Whitten (Mass., 1921), 132 N. E. 53. 
The often stated rule of the common law is that upon the dissolution 
of a corporation the real property reverts to the grantor and the personalty 
escheats to the lord. Co. LIT. l3b. Corporations in Coke's time, however, 
were ecclesiastic or municipal and conveyances to them were usually without 
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consideration. The development of the modern business corporation neces-
sitated a different treatmenf of assets on dissolution to prevent great hard-
ship. The modern rule is that in, equity all the property of a dissolved busi-
ness corporation will be treated as a trust fund, first for the payment of 
debts and then for the stockholders. 2 MORA\VS'!Z ON PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, 
§ 1032. In the instant case the unexpired term was valuable property, as 
proved by the lease to P at an increased rental. No good reason_for for-
feiture of this property is seen. In the English case of Hastings Corporatio1t 
v. Letto1~ (1go8), l K B. 378, in which it was held that the lease terminated 
upon the dissolution of the lessee corporation, the equitable rights of the 
stockholders were not considered, the question being whether the crown took 
by escheat or whether the le~sor's interest accelerated. bi re Mulli11gs Cloth-
ing Co., 238 Fed. 58, holds that the dissolution of a lessee corporation does 
not terminate the lease but amounts to an anticipatory breach which war-
rants the lessor in suing for damages. Other American cases to the same 
effect are cited therein. In the instant case the difficulty of a leasehold 
without a leaseholder is neatly disposed of by the court by treating the 
st9ckholders as tenants in common. But;, quaere, if the leasehold should 
depreciate in value and the stockholders elect to abandon the premises, could 
the lessor hold them for the unaccrued rentals? 
CRIMES-DISTINCTION BETWEEN "ATTEMJ!T," "!'ru;PARATION" AND "SOLlCI-
TATION."-The defendant asked one C to see certain jurors then sitting on 
trial of a case to which the defendant was' a party and endeavor to persuade 
them to return a verdict in his favor. He was indicted under a count 
charging attempted embracery. Held, defendant was properly convicted 
under the indictment. State v. Lavine (N. J., 1921), II5 Atl. 335. 
The court in the principal case seems to have confused the two separate 
offenses, attempt and solicitation. An attempt to commit a crime is an act 
done in part execution of a criminal design, amounting to more than mere 
preparation, which, if not prevented, would have resulted in the full con-
summation of the intended crime. U. S. v. Qi,incy, 6 Pet. 445; Graham v. 
People, 181 Ill. 477; State v. Taylor, 47 Ore. 455; Com. v. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 
267. Between preparation for the attempt and the attempt itself there is a 
difference. The preparation consists in devising or arranging the means or 
measures necessary for the commission of the offense. The attempt is the 
direct movement toward the commission after the preparations are made. 
Groves v. State, n6 Ga. 516; Hicks v. Co11i., 86 Va. 223; State v. Hitrley, 
79 Vt. 28; People v. Yoitngs, 122 Mich. 292. Solicitation is the act of solicit-
ing another to commit any crime amounting to felony, although the solicita-
tion is of no effect and the crime is not in fact committed. State v. Avery, 
7 Conn. 266; Lamb v. State, 67 Md. 524; State v. Hayes, 78 Mo. 307. Some 
courts have treated solicitation to commit a crime as though it were an 
"attempt." People v. Bloom, 133 N. Y. Sup. 708; State v. George, 79 Wash. 
262; State v. Bowers, 35 S. C. 262. By the weight of authority, however, 
solicitation is not considered a sufficient causal act to be indicted as an 
attempt, but must be indicted as a distinct offense. State v. Donovan, 28 
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Del. 40; Cox v. People, 82 Ill. 191; M cDade v. People, 29 Mich. 50. In the 
principal case there was clearly solicitation of C to commit the crime, rather 
than an attempt by t4e defendant to commit embracery himself. 
EQUITY-Rn.IEF ON CoNTRAcT FOR BENEFIT OF THIRD PERSON.-D Union 
contracted with P's predecessor to sell to the latter the entire loganberry 
crop of some of its members. In order to secure performance of this agree-
ment the union entered into contracts with the several growers by which it 
was constituted agent to sell the crops to P's predecessor and the growers 
agreed to deliver their crops to P's predecessor. Upon threatened breach 
of these contracts P brought a bill in equity for specific performance of the 
contracts and injunction against sale to others. On appeal from an order 
sustaining the demurrer of the growers it was held, that the injunction 
should have been granted. Phez Co. v. Salem Fmit Union et al. (Ore., 1921), 
201 Pac. 222. 
In the instant case there are several grounds for equitable relief-char-
acter of the chattels (see ne..'Ct note), avoidance of multiplicity of suits, and 
the nature of the contract involved. In regard to the last point the court 
says that there is respectable authority to the effect that the proper remedy 
for the breach of third-party beneficiary contracts is in equity rather than 
law. The only authority cited is Mr. W;illiston's very able argument in his 
work on CoNTRAcrs, § 358, 359, in which he points out the practical advan-
tages of determining the entire controversy in equity. However, Mr. Wil-
liston cites little authority on the subject. In Peel v. Peel, 017 W. R. 586, the 
beneficiary was given specific performance of a contract to pay an annuity 
on the ground that the promisee would suffer no pecuniary damage from the 
breach. In a subsequent English case, Re Rotherham Almn & Chemical Co., 
25 Ch. D. 103, Lord Lindley said that the beneficiary has no peculiar equity. 
No American cases seem to have passed squarely upon the subject. In some 
jurisdictions where the beneficiary cannot sue at law in his own name he is 
allowed to bring a bill in equity on the theory of being subrogated to the 
rights of his debtor. Smith v. Robins, 149 C. C. A. 324; Palmer v. Bray, 
136 Mich. 85; Grem v. McDonald, 75 Vt. 93. Such cases obviously afford 
no authority for the principal case because Oregon permits an action at law. 
Davidson v. 1vI adden, 89 Ore. 209. It will be interesting to note whether, 
in the absence of other equitable grounds, the courts will follow Mr. Willis-
ton and the principal case. 
EQUITY-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE oF CONTRACT 'l'O SELL CHATTELS.-For 
statement of facts, see preceding note on Phez v. Salem Fruit Union. 
The doctrine is well settled that ordinarily contracts for the delivery of 
chattels· will not be specifically enforced. The reason is that money damages 
will usually compensate the disappointed promisee and permit him to pur-
chase other chattels of like kind. However, if the legal remedy is inade-
quate the contract may be specifically enforced. POMEROY ON EQUITY JURIS-
PRUDENCE, §§ 2170, 2171. Some of the reasons for the inadequacy of the 
legal remedy are that the chattel is unique, that the supply is limited, or 
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that the damages are conjectural. In the instant case it was alleged that 
the total crop of loganberries was quite limited and that the berries con-
tracted for were essential to the carrying on of P's canning business. Thus 
the legal remedy appears to be entirely inadequate. Like chattels could not 
be obtained elsewhere and ascertaining the damage would involve an inquiry 
into lost profits and possibly the value of P's business. In Curtice Bros. Co. 
v. Catts, 72 N. J. Eq. 831, a contract to sell tomatoes was specifically 
enforced because of the uncertainty of the market. Other examples of the 
enforcement of delivery of rather prosaic chattels may be found in Equitable 
Gas Light Co. v. Baltimore Coal Tar & Mfg. Co., 63 Md. 285, (coal tar); 
Glo1icester I. & G. Co. v. Russia Cement Co., 154 Mass. 92, (fish skins); 
Omaha Lmnber Co. v. Cooperative Inv. Co., 55 Colo. 171, (standing timber). 
The principal case would appear to be well within such a line of authorities. 
EvmEN<:e-PROBATIVE VALUE oF PRESU?.1PTIONS.-In an action to recover 
for baggage destroyed by fire, the defendant offered in evidence rates filed 
with the Interstate Commerce Commission to show that the goods accepted 
as baggage should be classed as merchandise. The court ruled that the rate 
schedules were not conclusive unless they were also on file in the railway 
office. When the defendant rested he had introduced no evidence to prove 
this, but held, that since there was a penalty for failure to file the schedule 
of rates, the presumption of innocence could be used as evidence to aid 
defendant in establishing the fact of the rates being filed, but would not 
justify a directed verdict since it was opposed by the conflicting presump-
tion that the agent acted correctly in accepting the goods as baggage. Simp-
son v. Central Vt. R. Co. (Vt., 1921), II5 Atl. 299. 
The decision is in accord with previous Vermont holdings. It was held 
reversible error for the trial court to refuse to charge that the presumption 
of undue influence was to be regarded as a piece of evidence to be weighed. 
in favor of the contestants. fo re Cowdry's Will, 77 Vt. 359. Reliance is 
placed on Cofli,n v. United States, 156 U. S. 432, which held that the pre-
sumption of innocence was to be considered as evidence in favor of the 
accused, and that an instruction as to the necessity of proving him guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt was not sufficient. This rule was again approved 
in Kirby v. United States, 174 U. S. 47. It has been held that the fact that 
a woman endorsed certificates of stock created a presumption that she knew 
their contents, and the presumption stood in lieu of evidence of the fact, 
and should be weighed against facts offered in rebuttal. Williams v. Vree-
land, 244 Fed. 346. But it seems that the Supreme Court earlier entertained 
a different opinion from that e..-..:pressed in Co$n v. United States, supra. 
As, "the presumption that public officers have done their duty, like the pre-
sumption of innocence, is undoubtedly a legal presumption; but it does not 
supply proof of a substantive fact." United States v. Ross, 92 U. S. 28r. 
And also, "presumptions are indulged to supply the place of facts; they are 
never allowed against ascertained and established facts. When these appear, 
presumptions disappear." Li11colti v. French, 1051 U. S. 6r4 These two deci-
sions suggest what appears to be the more accurate and sound rule-i. e._. 
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that presumptions only affect the burden of going forward with the evidence, 
or operate to make a Prima facie case, but have no probative value in them-
selves apart from the substantive facts which give rise to them. This view 
is approved by authorities. THAYF;R, PREI.u.r. TR:e.AT. Evm., 314, 575; 4 
WrGMORE, Evm., Sec. 2491. It is also the view more generally accepted by 
the courts. See 13 MrcH. L. REv. 504; 8 Cor,. L. REv. 127. It is said that 
"presumptions are rules of convenience based upon experience or public 
policy, and established to facilitate the ascertainment of truth in the trial 
of causes." Ward v. Teller Reservoir & Irrigatio1i Co., 6o Colo. 47. See 
also Helbig v. Citizens /11s11ra11ce Co., 234 Ill. 251; Nicholso1i v. Neary, 77 
Wash. 294. "A presumption of fact will not be permitted to contradict or 
overcome facts actually proved." Westem Advertising Co. v. Starr Ptlb-
lishing Co., 146 Mo. App. 90. It was held error to find for the plaintiff upon 
no other proof than the fact that his cow was found dead near the tracks, 
which in the lower court was deemed to prove that it was killed by a train; 
on appeal it was decided that this conclusion could only be reached by erro-
neously giving probative effect to a presumption. U11io1i Pacific R. Co. v. 
B1tllis, 6 Colo. App. 64- Many courts appear not to discriminate between 
the two views as to the probative effect of presumptions, but assume that 
the distinction is merely academic. That it is important, however, is explained 
in Hall v. State, 78 Fla. 420, where it was held that the lower court properly 
refused to instruct that the presumption of innocence should go to the jury 
as evidence, because it incorrectly assumed that there were stages in the 
process of conviction. I. Overcoming the presumption of innocence. 2. 
Proving the defendant guilty. The fallacy of this is seen in regarding the 
proof as not sufficient when the presumption of innocence is o"--.,come, 
because the defendant is then in effect still presumed to be innocent. The 
same reasoning is applicable to any presumption of fact which j' claimed to 
have probative effect, and shows the error in the principal case which regards 
the two opposing presumptions as evidence. 
GrFTs-AssrGNMENT oF SAVINGS BANK D:eros1T.-Deceased, in the pres-
ence of his wife, delivered a written order to the bank, transferring his sav-
ings account standing in his name to a joint account between himself and 
wife, subject to withdrawal by check, in the event of death of either the 
balance to belong to the survivor. The pass book was in the bank's posses-
sion. Held, not a valid gift, since the depositor did not in his lifetime release 
control and dominion over the account. Pearre v. Grossnickle (Md., 1921), 
II5 Atl. 49. 
To constitute a valid gift of a chose in action, since there can be no 
actual delivery of the subject matter, the donor must surrender to the donee 
his voucher of right or title-that which is essential to his dominion over 
the subject of the gift. Cook v. Lm1i, 55 N. J. L. 373. Often in the case of 
savings bank accounts presentation of the bank book is essential in order 
for one to draw on the account. Where that is the case, a delivery of the 
savings bank book with intent to give the donee the deposits represented 
by the book constitutes a completed gift. Hill v. Stevenson, 63 Me. 364 
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But if, after delivering to the donee a written assignment of the fund 
making the donor and donee joint owners. the donor retains the pass book, 
there is no valid gift. Wlzalm v. Milholland, 89 Md. 199. The real basis 
for this decision is not that advanced in one part of the opinion-being a 
joint owner, the donor could defeat the gift himself by withdrawing the 
entire fund-for the donee, as joint owner, would have the same power. 
The true reason is that given later in the opinion-that, since the donor 
retained the pass book which was necessary for the withdrawal of the money, 
he did not surrender dominion over the fund. The principal case relies 
upon this decision, but there is an important difference between the facts 
in the two cases. In the principal case, the bank in which the money was 
deposited held the pass book. Could it be said then that possession of the 
bank book was necessary to dominion over the fund? Where the debtor 
bank holds the book and the book therefore has nothing to do with dominion 
over the account, the case is analogous to one where a book has never been 
issued or where it is lost. In such a case, a valid gift may be made by delivery 
of a written assignment. Candee v. Coim. Sav. Bank, 71 Atl. 551. The fact 
that the donor was still a joint owner and could defeat the gift by withdraw-
ing by check the whole amount should not invalidate the gift, since he had 
made as complete a surrender of dominion as was possible and still keep it 
a joint account. When as complete a delivery is made as the nature of the 
subject matter will permit, it has been held that the gift is valid. Dinslage 
v. Stratmmi, 18o N. w,_ 81 ;. 19 MICH. L. ~v. 656. 
HIGHWAYS-LIABII,ITY OF ABUTTING LAND OWNER FOR DEFECTS IN TREES 
STANDING WITHIN LIMITS OF PUBLIC HIGHWAY.-A tree standing on defend-
ant's land, but within the limits of a public highway, fell across the traveled 
part of the highway, severely injuring the plaintiff, who was driving past in 
an automobile. The tree was 'alive when it fel!, but there was a serious 
defect in it which had existed for several years. Held, there was no legal 
duty on the defendant;, the servient fee owner, to safeguard the traveler 
against dangers from defects in trees standing within the limits of the county 
road. Zacharias v. Nesbitt (Minn., I92I), I85 N. W. 295. 
In the absence of any legislative enactment upon the subject, an abutting 
land owner is not liable to travelers for injuries received by them because 
of a defect in the street in front of his premises, unless such defect was 
caused by his own act or fault. ELLIOTT, ROADS AND STRESTS, 539. The prin-
cipal case held that decayed limbs of trees, or trees likely to fall, are defects 
of highways within the above principle. However, in Weller v. McCormick, 
52 N. J. L. 470, it was held that where an abutting land owner planted a tree 
on the sidewalk in front of his premises, he was bound to use reasonable 
care to prevent the tree from becoming dangerous to travelers, and one 
injured by his failure to do so would be entitled to recover compensation. 
The court in the principal case declined to say whether a different rule 
should be applied to trees found growing on a rural highway when it was 
laid out and trees planted by the abutting owner in a village or city street. 
In Hewisoii v. City of New Haveii, 37 Conn. 475, it was asserted that at 
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common law the owners of trees standing on the highway were liable for 
injuries occurring in consequence of their neglect to trim them, but the 
statement was not necessary to a decision of the case, which concerned the 
liability of a city for an alleged public nuisance, and in Jones v. City of New 
Haven, 34 Conn. l, 0apparently the authority relied on, the liability of the 
city for injuries to a traveler caused by a tree falling in a public park was 
based on the charter and by-laws of the city rather than on the fact that 
the city was owner and in possession of the tree. On the other hand, munici-
pal corporations have often been held liable for injuries caused by falling 
trees because of their duty to maintain the highways, a reasonable degree 
of care being the test for liability. Lundy v. Sedalia, 162 Mo. App. 218; 
Chase v. City of Lowell, 151 Mass. 422; McGarey v. City of New York, 85 
N. Y. Supp. 861; J 01Ms v. Greensboro, 124 N. C. 310. See Miller v. City of 
Detroit, 156 Mich. 630, contra. In the principal case, the court, following 
the decision in N 0011an v. City cf Stillwater, 33 Minn. 198, held that the fact 
that counties and statutory towns were not liable for damages occasioned 
by defects in the public highways, even though charged with the duty of 
keeping them in repair, was no valid reason for placing the liability for 
injuries caused by such defects on the abutting land owner, and the decision 
would seem to be satisfactory, even though in that state the risk of falling 
trees on the rural highways is thereby assumed by the traveler. 
HusnAND AND \VIFJ~-HusnAND LIABLE FOR WIFF!s CRIME IN Ho:ME.-
W owned the house in which she lived with her husband. She manufactured 
and sold whisky in the home in violation of Act No. 53 of the Public Acts 
of 1919. W and her husband were jointly charged with the offense. Evi-
dence tended to show that the husband had disapproved of W's activities. 
Held, both were guilty of violating the statute. People v. Sybisloo (Oct., 
1921), 216 Mich. l. 
When a wife commits a crime in the presence of her husband coercion 
is generally presumed, but this is rebuttable. Commonwealth v. H opkfos, 
133 Mass. 381; U. S. v. Terry, 42 Fed. 317. Although otherwise in the case 
of criminal acts 111almn ii~ se, if a statutory crime is merely malum prohibi-
tum criminal intent may not be necessary. Commonwealth v. Boynton, 2 
Allen 16o (defendant honestly believed the liquor sold was not intoxicating); 
King v. The State, 66 Miss. 502 (same, "He was bound at his peril to ascer-
tain and know the nature of the article [liquor] which he sold"); 20 MICH. 
L. REv. 109. Contra: Farrell v. The State, 32 Ohio St. 456 ("The accused's 
intention at the time of the sale [of liquor] was involved in the issue.") 
The decisions based upon facts substantially like those of the principal case 
apply one of three rules regarding a husband's liability for his wife's crim-
inal acts in the absence of coercion. l. If the acts of the wife are without 
the consent and against the will of the husband, mere knowledge of the acts 
will not impose liability upon him. Commonwealth v. Hill, 145 Mass. 305 
(W owned the house in which she and H lived, and she sold liquor and con-
ducted the business of gambling and prostitution therein) ; Commonwealth 
v. Pratt, 126 Mass. 462 (\V conducted a hotel arid sold liquor in a portion 
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of the house rented by her and used as a home for W, and H) ; Commis-
sioners of Excise v. Keller, 20 How. Pr. 28o (semble). 2. The hu!lband has 
power to regulate his household, and his liability is absolute if he fails to 
prevent his wife from making an illegal use of the home. Commonwealth 
v. Barry, n5 Mass. 146 (H o~vned the house, but W 0was carrying on the 
business· in her own name and violated the liquor statute); Commonwealth 
v. Wood, 97 Mass. 225 (W owned the house used as a home, and conducted 
therein the business of prostitution) ; Commonwealth v. Kennedy, II9 Mass. 
2II (H and W owned the house, and W conducted a' hotel and sold liquor 
in a part of it) ; State v. Roz11m, 8 N. D. 548. 3. If the husband has knowl-
edge of the fact that his wife is making an illegal use of the family dwelling-
house he is bound to use reasonable means to prevent her acts. Commo11r 
wealth v. Walsh, 165 Mass. 62 (W used a part of the house as a store and 
made illegal sales of liquor). Where a wife acts as agent for her husband 
in a business not connected with the home, and violates the liquor law, the 
husband is not liable unless the illegal acts were done with his knowledge 
and consent. Seibert v. State, 40 Ala. 60. Also, State v. Pisaniello, 88 N. J. 
Law 262 (sale of liquor to a minor). The principal case adopts the third 
rule, and, consistent with the cases holding the husband liable even in the 
absence of coercion, reasons that the common-law right of the husband to 
regulate and control his own household imposes upon him a duty to use all 
"reasonable means" to prevent the commission of this class of ille!f<il acts 
by his wife. The cases have not decided or suggested how far he must go 
before he has discharged the duty of using "reasonable means." Danger of 
exposing the wife to a criminal prosecution inheres in any active· measures 
which the husband might take to prevent her criminal activities. With this 
consideration, it is submitted that domestic tranquility and social welfare 
are best secured by applying the first rule whenever the facts are similar to 
those in the principal case. 
INJUNCTIONS-LABOR UNIONs-"CH!lCK-OFF" SYSTF:M.-A conspiracy was 
formed between the coal mine operators of the Central Competitive Field 
(Western Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois-) and their miners (mem-
bers of the United Mine 'Vorkers of America) to coerce mine operators of 
the Williamson District (West Virginia and Kentucky) into unionizing their 
mines. The result of such action would have been to raise the price of the 
Williamson District product so that it could not compete with the· Central 
Competitive Field through interstate commerce. To accomplish their design 
the United Mine Workers sent into West Virginia over two and a half mil-
lion dollars, and a veritable state of war existed until the President was 
forced to send troops into the state to quell the disturbances. Union funds 
were raised by means of the "check-off" system. Under this system assess-
ments are taken from the wages of the miners by the operators and paid 
by them to the Union. Plaintiff, a non-union operator in the Williamson 
District, obtained a temporary injunction, enjoining, inter alia, the raising 
of money by means of the "check-off." 275 Fed. 871. On appeal it was 
held, that this. phase of the injunction should be modified, that the operation 
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of the "check-off" system should not have been enjoined. It was held proper, 
however, to enjoin the sending of money into West Virginia to be used in 
aiding or promoting the unlawful acts. Gasaway v. Borderland Goa! Cor-
poratio1i, U. S. C. C. A., 7th Ct., Oct. Term, 1921. 
The reasoning of the court seems to be that, conceding the "check-off" 
to be one of the elements in the chain of causation which resulted in the 
injury, it would have been innocuous had it not been for the immediate 
interfering acts. Since these unlawful acts have been enjoined it is not 
necessary to enjoin the "check-off" system itself. Having enjoined the 
proximate causes of the injury, the court refuses to extend the remedy to 
a more remote cause. An injunction should be no broader than the neces-
sities of the case require. Norfolk So11them R. Co. v. Stricklin, 264 Fed. 
546; Rider v. York Havm W. and P. Co., 242 Pa. 141. But the court should 
grant all the relief which the facts demand. In the principal case it would 
seem that that part of the injunction which prohibits the sending of money 
to aid unlawful acts would be difficult to enforce. Violations of it would 
be very difficult to detect and hard to stop. It would be more feasible to 
enjoin the source of these wrongful occurrences, the "check-off" system. 
A lawful issue of bonds has been enjoined when the proceeds were to have 
been used for an unlawful purpose. Town of Afto1i v. Gill, 57 Oki. 36; 
Bates v. City of Hastings, 145 Mich. 574- However, these cases may be 
distinguished from the principal one in that in them all of the money so 
raised was to be used unlawfully, while in the principal case only a part of 
it was probably so used. But in Seastream v. New Jersey Exhibition Co., 
67 N. J. Eq. 178, Sunday baseball games were enjoined because the crowd 
drawn by them was a nuisance to neighboring property owners, and stop-
ping the cause :was the only effectual way of abating the nuisance. See also 
Walker v. Brewster, L. R. 5 Eq. 25; Bellamy v. Wells, 39 W. R. 158. The 
doctrine of these cases is applicable in the principal case. It is true that, 
upon the motion for preliminary injunction, the balance of convenience 
might justify refusal of the relief. Yet, the district court having granted 
the relief, it would seem that there was not such an abuse of discretion as 
to warrant reversal. 
INSURANC.E-Accm.ENT-PRovis10N FOR FoRF.EITURE IN CASE OF CREMATION 
WITHOUT NoTlC.E.-In an action on an accident insurance policy which con-
tained a provision that in the event of death by accidental means the policy 
would be forfeited if the insured was cremated without first giving the 
company seven days' notice, it was held, by a divided court, three to three, 
that the provision was unreasonable and would not be· enforced. Kroner v. 
Order of United Commercial Travelers of A11ierica (Wis., 1921), 184 N. 
w. 1037. 
An insurance policy is a contract between the parties thereto, and in 
general the rules established for the construction of written instruments 
apply to contracts of insurance. Liverpool, etc., Ins. Co. v. Kearney, 18o 
U. S. 132; Continental Ins. Co. v. K·yle, 124 Ind. 132. While forfeitures in 
such policies are never favored, and ambiguous provisions are construed 
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most strongly against the insurer, yet "if, upon a reasonable construction, it 
appears that the parties contracted for a forfeiture upon certain conditions, 
it only remains for the courts to enforce the contract as the parties have 
made it. It is neither unlawful nor against public policy for a contract of 
life insurance to stipulate that upon certain conditions the policy shall be 
void." Northwesteni Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hazelett, I05 Ind. 2I2; North-
western Masonic Aid Assn. v. Bodurtha, 23 Ind. App. I2I; Dumas v. North-
westeri~ Nat. Ins. Co., I2 App. Cas. (D. C.) 245. Nor should a court refine 
away the terms of a policy which are expressed with sufficient clearness to 
convey the plain meaning of the parties. Guarantee Co. v. Mechanics', etc., 
I83 U.S. 402; lnsttrance Co. v. Boon, 95 U.S. II7; Schroeder v. Imperial 
Ins. Co., I32 Cal. I8; Schuermami v. The Dwelling House Ins. Co., I6I III. 
437. In the principal case, the provision was clear, there was no dispute as 
to its true meaning, and inasmuch as it was intended to give the insurer the 
opportunity of making an examination of the cause of the death of the 
insured at a time when the evidences were available, the provision would seem 
to be a reasonable one, and should have been enforced. Provisions for exam-
ination of the insured by a medical examiner of the insurer, or for an 
autopsy, are reasonable and well calculated for the proper protection of the 
insurer, and will be enforced provided they are claimed under reasonable 
circumstances. VANCE ON INSURANCE, 588. In the principal case there was 
a dispute as to the actual cause of the death of the insured, and if the deci-
sion is followed, in such cases the rights of the insuring company may be 
very seriously prejudiced through a lack of opportunity for adequate inquiry. 
INSURANCE-DEATH WHU.E IN MILITARY SERVICE.-Decedent's life insur-
ance policy, dated October 20, I9I3, contained an exception that "Military 
or naval service in time of war * * * is a risk not assumed * * * but the 
legal reserve * * * will be * * * payable in case of death while in such serv-
ice." He was inducted into the military service in September, I9I8, and 
sent to a California camp. On December 2, I9I8, he was granted a leave 
of absence (or furlough) until midnight. While en route to the Pacific 
coast on such leave decedent's autocycle collided with an automobile, and 
he was killed. Held, plaintiff could recover face of policy, because the acci-
dent "was not a risk of military service." Atkinson v. Indiana Nat. Life 
Ins. Co. (Ind. App., I921), I32 N. E. 263. 
Where the language of an insurance policy is ambiguous it will be con-
strued most favorably to the insured. Manufacturers' Accident Indemnity 
Co. v. Dorgan, 58 Fed. 956; Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Michael, I67 Ind. 659. 
An exemption clause like that in the principal case is not void as against 
public policy. Miller v. Illinois Bankers' Life Assn., 2I2 S. W. 310; 3 JOYCE 
ON INSURANCE, § 2237. In the principal case the court evidently considered 
causatio1i, not status, to be the test for the application of the exemption 
clause. The conflicting cases in point are collected and considered in 18 
MICH. L. R.Ev. 686, with the conclusion that most of the cases present no 
real occasion for construction and that status should be the test for liability. 
Later cases are cited in I9 MICH. L. Rev. 443. The most recent cases refus-
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ing full payment and accepting stallls as the test are: Field v. W estem Life 
Iudemnity Co. (Texas Civ. App.). 227 S. W. 530 (death by suicide while 
in A. E. F.); Railey v. United Life & Accident Ins. Co. (Ga. App.), 1o6 
S. E. 203 (soldier being transported to France, drowned by accidental col-
lision at sea). Recent cases allowing full payment and adopting the causa-
tion test are: Boatwright v. Americaii Life Ins. Co. (Iowa), 180 N. W. 321 
(sailor died of influenza at naval training station); Gorder v. Lincoli~ Nat. 
Life Ins. Co. (N. D.), 18o N. W. 514 (pneumonia, evidence of increased 
risk by reason of camp conditions admissible but insufficient in instant case) ; 
Rex Health & Accident Ins Co. v. Pettiford (Ind. App.), 129 N. E. 248 
(death from influenza, at Camp Custer); Farmers Nat. Life Ins. Co. of 
America v. Carman (Ind. App.), 132 N. E. 6g7 (death from pneumonia, 
while in S. A. T. C.). If the war ended on November II, 1918, it is clear 
that the principal case is correctly decided. But that fact is not considered. 
The question was raised in Slaughter v. Protective Leag1ee Life Ins. Co. 
(Mo. App.), 223 S. W. 819, but left undecided. 
LANDI.ORD AND TENANT-LIABILITY OF- LESSOR FOR LEASING PREMISES 
INFECTED WITH HoG CHOI.ERA.-Defendant leased his farm to plaintiff. 
Within one month after plaintiff moved on the farm hog cholera broke out 
among his hogs and many of them died. Plaintiff sued defendant for dam-
ages, alleging, but failing to prove, knowledge by defendant that premises 
were infected, and that he fraudulently concealed that fact when the lease 
was made. Held, in absence of fraud, or any agreement to the effect that 
the premises may be safely used for the purposes for which they are intended, 
defendant is not liable for condition of premises. K1itchera v. Graft (Iowa, 
1921), I84 N. W. 297. 
This case is unique on the facts. It is, however, analogous to those 
cases where the letting of infected premises results in the sickness or death 
of a tenant or some member of his family. The general rule in such cases 
is that the lessor is liable, on the basis of negligence, if he had actual knowl-
edge that the premises were infected with a contagious disease when let. 
There is a duty on him to warn the tenant of such a dangerous condition. 
Cesar v. Karntz, 60 N. Y. 229; Minor v. Sharon, II2 Mass. 477; Cutter v. 
Hamlet•, 147 Mass. 471; SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE,§ 709. Recovery 
on this basis is difficult inasmuch as the plaintiff must prove that the prem-
ises were infected, that the defendant knew of the infection, and that the 
disease was communicated through the premises. Even if the lesso:r knew 
that the premises had been infected, if they were thereafter disinfected by 
one apparently qualified, the lessor is not liable for the sickness of a subse-
quent lessee's child. Finney v. Steele, 148 Ala. 197. While the decision in 
the instant case may very well rest on.lack of proof of defendant's knowl-
edge that the premises were infected, the court expressly adopts and applie" 
the general rule that the lessee has no cause of action unless there has been 
a fraudulent concealment by the lessor, or a warranty that the premises are 
fit for the purpose intended. This ruling apparently disregards the well-
established distinction between patent and latent defects. As fo the former, 
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the rule of caveat emptor applies, and there is no implied warranty that the 
premises are fit for the purposes for which they are leased. The Shinkle, 
Wilson & Kreis Co. v. Bir11ey & Seymour, 68 Ohio St. 328; UNDF;RHILI,, 
LANDI,ORD AND TENANT, § 477. However, it is generally admitted that the 
lessor is liable for loss or injury caused by latent defects in the leased prem-
ises, of which he had actual knowledge at the time of making the lease, but 
which he did not disclose to the lessee. Ma11sell v. Hands, 235 Mass. 253; 
Joh11ston v. Nichols, 83 Wash. 394; Kurtz v. Pauly, I58 Wis. 534. See also 
note to Walsh v. Schmidt, 34 L. R. A. (n. s.) 7g8. 
LANDI,ORD AND TENANT-PROVISION IN LEASE NOT TO ASSIGN WITHOUT 
CONSENT OF LESSOR-EFFECT OF BREACH.-Petitioners leased to two persons 
with a provision against assigning or subletting without the written consent 
of the lessors. A corporation was to be formed by the lessees and it was 
agreed that they might assign to it on a form which was provided and which 
bore a place for the lessors' consent. The lessees assigned to this corpora-
tion, but not by means of the form provided and without the lessors' con-
sent. After occupation for some time, the corporation became bankrupt, 
and notwithstanding a notice b;y the lessors that the lease was forfeited, it 
was decreed that the trustee in bankruptcy was entitled to the leasehold. 
Upon review, the court held, there had been no effective transfer of the lease 
fo the corporation, and reversed the decree. bi re Lindy-Friedman Clothing 
Co., Inc. (U. S. D. C., Ala., I92I), 275 Fed. 453. 
It is undisputed that a lease may be assigned or sublet unless the lessee 
is restrained by statutory provision or by the lease itself. Under the latter 
category the effect of a breach differs, depending on whether the restraint 
is by a covenant or by a condition with a power of re-entry. I TIFFANY 
LANDI,ORD AND TENANT, § 152j ;. 2 UNDERHII,I,, LANDI,ORD AND TENANT, § 624. 
If it is by a covenant;, the general rule is that an assignment in breach of it 
passes the title of the leasehold to the assignee. Williams v. Earle, L. R. 3 
Q. B. 739; Meyer v. Alliance Investmeiit Co., 84 N. J. L. 450. "A covenant 
not to do a thing really implies the power to do it. An assertion· of the 
breach affirms that the covenantor has effectively done what he covenanted 
not to do." Shirk v. Arfams, 130 Fed. 44I. The only remedy of the lessor 
is an action for damages against the covenantee. People v. Gilbert, 64 Ill. 
App. 203. It is said in Wray-Austfo Machinery Co. v. Flower, 140 Mich. 452, 
that the assignment works a forfeiture, but the cases cited do not support 
this dictmn-. See also Rees v. Andrews, l6g Mo. 177; Emery v. Hill, 67 N. 
H. 330. However, if the restraint on assignment is imposed as a condition 
the lessor may re-enter for the breach and cut off the assignee's estate. 
Kew v. Trainor, 150 Ill. 150; Shaftuck v. Lovejoy, 74 Mass. 204. But the 
breach does not ipso facto terminate the estate. It passes to the assignee and 
is valid until re-entry by the lessor. Keegan v. Heile111a1i Brewing Co., 129 
Minn. 4g6; Taylor v. Marshall, 255 Ill. 545. In the principal case there was 
a right of re-entry reserved to the lessors for a violation of any provision 
of the lease. But the opinion of the court is rather obscure as to whether 
it considered the provision restricting assignment as a covenant or as a 
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condition. If the former, the title of the lease should be in the bankrupt 
corporation. I1i re Pennewell, II9 Fed. I39; Hag11e v. Ahrens, 53 Fed. 58. 
If the latter, the notice of forfeiture given by the lessors divested the estate 
iIJ. the corporation, and the result reached in the case is correct. 
LAW OF NATIONS-SE!Ztrae AND SALE OF ENEMY MERCHANT SHIP EXTIN-
GUISHES PRIOR L!EN.-The Nyanza (Esslingen). a German merchant ship, 
arrived at Manilla on the 9th of August, I9I4 carrying a cargo belonging to 
libelant, a French national. Upon demand of libelant's Manilla agent the 
master refused to deliver the cargo, and subsequently allowed the ship to be 
interned by the United States government. Libelant recovered a judgment 
against the owners, _for loss of cargo, and attached the ship. After the 
United States entered the war the ship was seized and, by authority of Con-
gress and the President, turned over to the United States Shipping Board. 
Under authority of the Act of Congress o.f June 5, Ig2I, it was sold to the 
claimant "clear of all claims or liens." Libelant sought to enforce . the 
admiralty lien and the lien obtained by attachment. Held, that seizure and 
sale operated to cut off claims against the ship. The Nyanza (D. C., E. D., 
N. Y., I92I), 276 Fed. 415. 
The right of a belligerent to seize and condemn as prize an enemy mer-
chant ship found in the belligerent's port· at the outbreak of war is almost 
undisputed. The Marie Leo1ihardt [I92I], P. I; The Thalia, 2 Russ. and 
Jap. P. C. u6; HAU.EcK's INT. LAw, 4th ed., II, g6; 20 MICH. L. REv. II4-
The condemnation proceedings may take place even after peace is concluded. 
T!ie Blonde and Other Ships [I92I], P. 155; 20 MICH. L. REv. u3. In deter-
mining the national character of a ship, courts of prize generally look only 
to the legal title. A bona fide sale of a ship by an enemy, immi1iente bello 
or fiagra11te bello, ts valid. The Ariel, II Moo. P. C. C. n9; The Ed11a [19I9], · 
P. I57· If the ship comes into the possession of the purchaser before seizure 
the sale is valid, although made in transitu. The Baltica, II Moo. P. C. C. 
I41. But mortgages and liens are generally disregarded in prize courts, 
even when created in good faith. The Hampton, 5 Wall. 372; The Miria1100 
(I805), 6 C. Rob. 24 In The Tobago (I8o4), 5 C. Rob. 2I8, a bottomry 
bond had been acquired by a national subject, in good faith, before the out-
break of war. In condemning the captured ship, and refusing the national's 
claim, the court said that "he [the national] acquires the jus iii [ad?] rem, 
but not the j11s iii re, until it has been converted and appropriated by the 
final process of a court of justice. * * * If there is no change of property 
there can be no change of national character." Likewise, where the lien is 
on a neutral ship, in favor of an enemy, the ship cannot be condemned as 
prize, even pro tanto. The Ariel, s11pra. A limited class of liens may give 
a j11s i1v re. The Frances, 8 Cr. 4I8; HALLECK'S INT. LAW, 4th ed., II, us. 
Although reaching a harsh result, upon principle of international law the 
instant case is correctly decided. The libelant might look to the generosity 
of the captor for compensation. 
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LEASE-CO~NAN'.i.' AGAINST ASSIGN?.IEN'.i.' WI'.i.'HOU'.i.' CONSENT-POWER OF 
LIQUIDA'.i.'OR '.i.'O Ass1GN.-Appellant had leased premises in question to Far-
row's Bank in 1910 for a term of twenty-one years. The lease contained a 
covenant by "the lessees, their successors and assigns," not to assign the 
demised premises without previous consent in writing of the lessor. The 
company was ordered to be wound up compulsorily in January, 1921. A dis-
pute having arisen as to the powers and duties of the liquidator with respect 
to the lease, the court of equity was called upon to declare, inter alia, 
whether or not the liquidator was bound, by the covenant restricting assign-
ment. Held, that the liquidator was bound by the covenant. Iti re Farrow's 
Bank, Ld. [1921], 2 Ch. 164. 
The decision in this case is interesting not so much because of its hold-
ing as to the powers of the liquidator under the Companies Act of 1908, but 
because of the reasoning upon which the court proceeded. Under the Com-
panies Act, the liquidator, who is appointed by the court, and resembles the 
American receiver, takes over full control of the company, and does all nec-
essary acts on its behalf. None of the property is vested in the liquidator, 
however, in which respect he differs from a trustee in bankruptcy. A trustee 
in bankruptcy has generally been held not to be bound by such a covenant 
restricting assignment, Gazlay v. Williams, 210 U. S. 41; Doe v. Beva1i, 
3 Maule & S. 353; even though the proceedings were begun upon the lessee's 
own petition. Bemis v. Wilder, 100 Mass. 446; fa re Riggs [1901]. 2 K B. 
16. The reason seems to be that the property has vested in the trustee by 
operation of law, and that then, either because he is under a duty imposed 
by law to dispose of it for the benefit of creditors, or because he is not a 
voluntary "assignee," he is not bound by the covenants. But the court in 
the principal case appeared not entirely in sympathy with rule or reason. 
Younger, L. J., referred to these bankruptcy cases as "somewhat anomalous," 
and said they were based on "no very intelligible principle." The court 
therefore refused to apply the rule of the bankruptcy cases,, basing its deci-
sion upon the narrow technical distinction that the property did not vest in 
the liquidator. Or perhaps it would be fairer to say that the court was not 
inclined to extend a rule which, even as regards bankruptcy, was considered 
as resting upon a very slender foundation. It is worthy of note that of two 
American decisions with reference to transfers by receivers one court held 
that the receiver was bound, Spencer v. Darlington, 74 Pa. 286; and the other 
that he was not bound, Fleming v. Fleming Hotel Co., 69 N. J. Eq. 715. 
MOR'.i.'GAGES-FORECUJSURE SALE-DES'.i.'RUC'.l'ION BY FIRE BEFORE CoN-
l!I!WA'.i.'ION.-On the foreclosure of a mortgage by advertisement and sale P 
purchased certain premises. A state statute, C. S., § 2591, provided that ten 
days should be allowed after a foreclosure sale for receiving additional bids, 
and if within that time a higher bid was offered there should be a resale. 
Before the expiration of the ten days a dwelling house on the premises, con-
stituting a third of the value, was accidentally destroyed by fire. P peti-
tioned to be released from his bid. On appeal it was held that P's status 
was only that of a preferred bidder, that the loss sustained by reason of the 
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fire did not fall on him, and that he should be released from his bid. In re 
Sermons' Land (N. C., 1921), 108 S. E. 497. 
The court concedes the prevailing rule to be that when there is a bind-
ing contract to convey the purchaser, as equitable owner, assumes the risk 
of loss from accidental fires. Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. 349. See 19 MICH. L. 
R.i>v. 576, 8 MICH. L. R.i>v. 515. But if either the vendor or purchaser has 
any option in regard to the performance of the contract the loss falls on the 
vendor. 2 W:ILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 932. For this reason it is generally 
held that a bidder at a judicial sale does not stand the risk of a loss occur-
ring before the court has confirmed his bid. Ex parte Minor, II Ves. 559; 
fo re Finks, 224 Fed. 92; Harrigai~ v. Golden, 58 N. Y. S. 726; Taylor v. 
Cooper, 10 Leigh (Va.) 3I7. But see contra, Cropper v. Brown, 76 N. J. Eq. 
4o6; Va11ce's Ad11i'r v. Foster, 72 Ky. 38g. Until the offer has been reported 
to the court and it has accepted it by confirmation there is no binding con-
tract and the prospective purchaser is not the equitable owner. Bowdofa v. 
Ha111111011d, 79 Md. 173. Until such confirmation the purchaser is nothing 
more than a preferred bidder. 3 JONES, MORTGAGES (Ed. 7), § 1637. The 
decision in the principal case is reached by construing the position of the 
prospective purchaser, during the ten days in which the sale is to remain 
open, as analogous to the position of the purchaser at a judicial sale before 
confirmation. ·Such a construction would seem warranted, and the result 
reached in the case is clearly a just one. 
MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS-FuTUM INSTALLMENTS AS CoNSTI'l'UTING 
P.rutSEN'l' "lNDEBTEDN£5S."-Land was deeded to the city of Sacramento for 
park purposes, the conveyance being subject to the condition subsequent 
that if the grantee should not expend a minimum of $5,000 per year for ten 
years on improvements the land should revert to the grantor. Suit by tax-
payer to have the deed declared void on the ground that it operated to create 
"indebtedness" of the city in violation of constitutional provisions was 
demurred to on the ground that the annual expenditure was to be met from 
current revenues and hence was not "indebtedness." Held, since the grantors 
had fully performed by delivering the property, the stipulated expenditure 
was really a consideration, and is "indebtedness," within the constitutional 
prohibition, of an amount equal to the sum of the installments. Chester v. 
Carmichael (Cal., 192I), 201 Pac. 925. 
There is an utter lack of harmony in the various interpretations placed 
by the different courts on the word "indebtedness." Particularly is this so 
when, as in the principal case, the transaction concerns a present agreement 
to pay future installments. There are two types of such agreements, one in 
which the entire consideration is furnished by the creditor at once, a~ by 
erecting a public improvement or conveying property to the city, and the 
other in which the consideration is furnished continuously through a period 
of years-for example, by supplying water, gas, or electricity. A majority 
of courts draw a. very sensible distinction between these types, regarding the 
former as creating indebtedness even though each iµstallment is to be paid 
from current revenues, and the latter otherwise, at least until the service is 
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actually rendered. Walla TY'alla v. Walla ·Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. I; 
Soiith Bend v. Reynolds, 155 Ind. 70. A few courts, however, adopt the 
rigid rule that the sum total of all the installments is "indebtedness,'' regard-
less of the object of the expenditure. Chicago v. McDonald, 176 Ill. 404. 
Such a rule places a municipality which has already exceeded the debt limit 
in an extremely embarrassing position by forcing it to do a cash business. 
On the other hand, a few courts have gone to the opposite extreme and 
decline to call any future installments "indebtedness" so long as they can 
' be met by current revenues. Giles v. De1miso1i, 15 Okla. 55. This construc-
tion throws a heavy burden upon present taxpayers. The California court, 
in rendering the present decision, declared itself in favor of the first of the 
above views, and decided that the expenditures of the principal case were 
unconstitutional since they were intended to pay for permanent improve-
ments rather than for current· services. But the opportunity of acquiring a 
park would seem to warrant a contrary result if one could possibly be 
reached on logical principles. The case has an unusual aspect by reason of 
the fact that the city would have been under no direct personal obligation 
to spend the $5,0oo annually. The only effect of default would have been 
reversion of the property. The condition subsequent would have had an 
effect similar to that of a mortgage on land without personal assumption of 
the mortgage debt, and this analogy might well have been applied to save the 
case. It is true that if a city mortgages its land, or if it buys property already 
subject to a mortgage, the mortgage is "indebtedness," even though there 
has been no personal assumption of liability. Mayor of Baltimore v. Gill, 
31 Md. 375; Waterworks v. Trebilcock, Mayor of Ironwood, 99 Mich. 454-
But a few courts have held that if a city purchases property, giving back a 
purchase money mortgage and stipulating that there shall be no corporate 
liability, there has been no indebtedness created within the constitutional 
prohibition. Burnham v. Milwaukee, 98 Wis. 128; Swaiison v. Ottmnwa, 
n8 Iowa 161. These cases rely upon the non-assumption of corporate lia-
bility combined with the fact that there is no chance of the city being forced 
to pay the debt to save property which it had previously held free from 
incumbrance. The situation which they present is similar to that in the 
principal case, and if their doctrine could have been applied to it the result 
would have been a salutary one. 
NEGI.IGENCE-!MPUTABLE-]OINT ENTERPRISE-HUSBAND AND WIFE.-
Plaintiff was riding in an automobile driven by her husband when she wa:i 
thrown from the car owing to a defect in the highway. Plaintiff and her 
husband were moving to another city, where they intended to reside, and at 
the tim~ of the accident the plaintiff was in the rear seat of the car. Held, 
that the husband's contributory negligence was not imputable to the wife, 
because they were not engaged in a joint enterprise. Britbaker v. Iowa 
Coimty (Wis., l92I), 183 N. W. 690. 
In speaking of joint enterprise, the court says, "doubtless there may 
be such special facts showing agency or •such joint financial interest in the 
undertaking as to make the negligence of the husband imputable to the wife, 
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and to defeat a recovery on her part. But no such facts are found in this 
case, and there is certainly no presumption that any such relation e..'Cisted. 
It was merely the ordinary social and domestic relationship involved when 
husband and wife are travelling together. * * * from the mere marital rela-
tionship the contributory negligence of the husband is not to be imputed to 
the wife." This case seems to be in line with the majority of recent cases 
involving the question, and it is believed presents the best view on reason 
and principle. Gaffney v. City of Dixon, 157 Ill. App. 589; Soutliem Ry. Co. 
v. King, 128 Ga. 383; Louisville Ry. Co. v. McCarthy, 129 Ky. 814 (followed 
in City of Louisville v .. Zoeller, 155 Ky. 192); K110%Ville Ry. & Light Co. v. 
Vangilder, 132 Tenn. 487; Se1ift v. West. Md. R>'· Co., 246 Pa. 446. In none 
of these cases, however, does the question of joint enterprise seem to ·have 
been raised. But in the case of Fisher v. Ellston, 174 Ia. 364, the court dis-
cusses that proposition at some length, in holding that the marital relation 
is not sufficient to make the travelling a joint enterprise, and that the hus-
band's contributory negligence could not be imputed to the wife. The prob-
lem raised in the principal case is discussed in a note in 33 HARV. L. R. 313. 
On question of joint enterprise in general, see notes in 5 IA. L. B. 121 and 
27 YALE L. J. 565. It cannot be denied that there is some authority holding 
a contrary doctrine to the principal case. See an excellent review of the cases 
in note in 8 L. R. A. (n. s.) 656. But this case would seem to present a 
sounder view and one more in accord with reason and justice. 
PuBLlC UTILITIIlS-CONS'l'l'.l'UTIONALITY OF ACT REGULATING RATES OF PRI-
VATE Co:MPANI:eS BUT NOT OF CoMPE'l'ING MUNICIPALLY OWNED PLANTS.-Bill 
in equity by a private gas and electric company to restrain the city from 
producing and selling electricity to private users without first filing a sched-
ule of rates as required by. law of private companies. Held, affirming 292 
Ill. 236, that plaintiff was not denied equal protection of the law by a statute 
making the rates of privately owned, but not of municipally owned, utilities 
subject to the approval of the commission. Springfield Gas a11d Electric Co. 
v. Springfield (U. S., 1921), Adv. 0. 38. 
In a very concise opinion, without the citation of a case, Mr. Justice 
Holmes upholds as reasonable the classification in the Illinois Municipal 
Ownership Act and Public Utilities Act of the public utilities as privately 
owned and municipally owned. One is organized for private ends, for profit; 
the other for public ends, for the public welfare. It has never been doubted 
that the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law permitted a 
classification of persons subject to act of legislature; the only serious dis-
putes have been over whether a given classification was reasonable, and there-
fore lawful. If reasonable, a classification is not unlawful because the act 
does not apply to all in the same class or line of business. German Alliance 
Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389; Ex parte Girard (Calif., 1921), 200 Pac. 593. 
The fear of ruinous competition was the animus of the attack in the instant 
case. In a proper case a competitor may invoke the aid of a court to entirely 
restrain the rival business. Brookly1i C1'ty R. Co. v. Whalen, 182 N. Y. S. 
283, affirmed 229 N. Y. 570; Memphis St. R>'· Co. v. Rapid Tra1isit Co., 133 
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Tenn. 99 (jitney-bus case); F. & M. Coop. Tel. Co. v. Boswell Tel. Co., 187 
Ind. 371, but it does not follow that relief will be given if the rival utility 
has been properly authorized to do business and is acting within such author-
ity. New Hartford Water Co. v. Village Water Co., 87 Conn. 183; nor if 
the complaining company has not itself been lawfully authorized to furnish 
service. Rural Home Tel. Co. v. Ky. and Ind. Tel. Co., 128 Ky. 209. This 
protection from injury to its business by competition not lawfully authorized 
is like the analogous cases in which the legality of a differentiation in unit 
rates for different kinds of uses of the same utility-e. g., the rates for gas 
used for fuel, or power, or light-is made to depend upon whether the dif-
ferent classes of users are in competition so that the discrimination in rates 
~ight injure the business of those charged the higher rate. Boerth v. 
Detroit City Gas Co., 152 Mich. 654- It is certain that many statutes have 
been passed applying to private and not to municipal corporations, but which 
the legislature might have applied alike to both. It is usually a matter that 
addresses itself to legislative discretion, and the courts will interfere only 
in a clear case of abuse of that discretion. Feemster v. Tupelo, 121 Miss. 
733. In any case, there can be no doubt that the supreme legislative body 
of the state has the power, if it chooses to exercise it, of regulating charges 
for the service of municipally owned utilities. Bartlesville v. Corporation 
Com. (Okl., 1921), 199 Pac. 3g6, and it would seem to follow that it can if 
it prefers leave the fixing of rates to the municipality itself. The principal 
case so holds. It would be strange indeed if the legislature may fix rates 
of a private corporation for a public service, and may allow a municipality 
to fix its own rates for service furnished by it, and yet it should turn out 
that a statute so providing should be found unconstitutional as a denial of 
equal protection of the laws. Neither the Illinois nor the federal supreme , 
court found it necessary to cite authorities on this point. 
Rr:MAIND!>RS To A Cr.ASS-WHEN Cr.ASS lliTERMINED.-There was a leg-
acy "to my sister for life and at her death the amount to be equally divided 
between 4er children." At the time of the testator's death the sister had 
four children living, but one died during the mother's life, leaving two chil-
dren of her own who are plaintiffs in this action. Held, the remainder vested 
at the death of the testator and the plaintiffs are entitled to one-fourth of 
the property. Powell v. McKinney (Ga., 1921), 108 S. E. 231. 
The intention of the testator or granter should control as to when the 
class is to be determined and the remainders vested, providing his intention 
does not conflict with the rule against remoteness or other absolute rules 
of law. The courts generally say his intention does control. Crossley v. 
Leslie, 130 Ga. 782. But the courts' interpretation of the words used is 
likely to be nearly as rigid as an absolute rule of law. In accordance with 
the rule that the law favors vested interests, it is said the instrument will, 
if possible, be construed to show an intent to determine the class as of the 
time when the instrument takes effect-i. e., when the deed is delivered or 
the testator dies. l TIFFANY ON REAL PROPERTY (Ed. 2) 497. In grants or 
devises of the type "to A for life" and "then," or "upon," or "after," or 
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"at" his death "to my children" or "to his children,'' etc., the authorities 
very generally support the instant case. The class is determined as of the 
time when the instrument takes effect and the remaindermen have a vested 
interest from that time. Ritzman' s Estate (Cal., 1921), 199 Pac. 783; Sher-
ley v. Sherley (Ky .. 1921), 232 S. W. 53; Holmes v. Holmes (Mich., 1921), 
183 N. \V. 784 Such interests, however, are not vested for all purposes. 
For instance, they are within the rule against remoteness. GRAY, Rm.:s 
AGAINST PlilU'ETUITms, § 83. As is said in Birdsall v. Birdsall, 157 Ia. 363, 
when the remainder is to all the members of the specified class, and the lan-
guage is not such as to prevent construction by the court, the remainder will 
be held to vest when the instrument takes effect. However, if no member 
of the class is then in existence, the remainder will be contingent until there 
is such member in existence, when it will vest in that member, subject to 
being opened to let in others until the time for distribution. Carver v. 
Jackson, 4 Peters l, go. "To A for life, then to my heirs" or "next of kin," 
generally gives a vested -interest from the time the instrument takes effect, 
Avinger v. Avinger (S. C., 1921). 107 S. E. 26; but when such remainder is 
subject to the condition "if A die without issue," there is a sharp conflict of 
authority. ANN. CAs. l917A 863-4. In Meyer v. Matthews (S. C., 1921), 
108 S. E. 174, upon such a devise the remainder was· held to vest at the 
testator's death, but subject to divestment. For the "New York rule" as to 
divesting remainders once vested, see 4 ~NT CoMMENTARIES (Ed. 14) 202-5. 
For an excellent analysis of that rule, see In re Moran's Will, u8 Wis. 177. 
If the remainder is to part of a class, as, for instance, to the survivors, there 
is great difficulty and sharp conflict. Some of our courts follow the early 
English decisions and hold that words of survivorship relate to the death of 
the testator unless there is a plain intent to apply them to a later period; 
that is to say, the class is determined as of that time. Ball v. Holla11d, 189 
Mass. 369; J ameso1i v. J ameso1i, 86 Va. 51 ; Ross v. Drake, 37 Pa. St. 373; 
In re Twaddell, IIO Fed. 145· But more generally in recent decisions if the 
words are open to construction they are held to relate to the termination 
of the particular estate, and the remainder vests at that time. In re Mora1i's 
Will, supra; Sullivaii v. Garesche, 229 Mo. 4g6; Sinto1i v. Boyd, 19 Ohio St. 
30; In re Winter's Estate, II4 Cal. 186; Bell v. Brfoso1i (Ga.; 1921), 108 S. 
E. 47; 2 }ARMAN ON WILLS (Am. Ed. 5) 674. The latter rule would seem 
the better in that it is more likely to give effect to the actual intent of the 
testator, and is not opposed to sound public policy. w;hen the limitation is 
to such1 members of the class as reach a certain age, sustain a given charac-
ter, do a particular act, etc., there being no distinct gift to the whole class, 
it is generally stated that the interest is contingent until some member of 
the class qualifies, when it becomes vested in him, subject to being opened 
to let in others. Coggi1is' Appeal, 124 Pa. St. 10; McArthur v. Scott, II3 
U. S. 340. The general rule as to remainders, that if the postponement of 
possession and enjoyment is merely for the convenience and benefit of the 
estate, or to let in other interests, and not for reasons personal to the remain-
derman, the remainder vests at the death of the testator. while if postpone-
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ment is annexed to the substance of the remainder and is personal to the 
remainderman, the remainder is contingent until the time set for distribu-
tion, applies to remainders to a class. Thomas v. Thomas, 247 Ill. 543. 
SALEs-R:esc1ssroN oF CoNTRAcr BECAUSE oF FAILURE oF Sm.I.ER To Fur.-
FILL WARRANTY.-The parties entered into a contract under which the 
defendant was to furnish and install two gas engines of 150 brake horse-
power each. Relying on the defendant's promise that the engines would be 
of this power, the plaintiff made a deposit. The engines the defendant had 
built according to the plaintiff's plans in fact tested only 140 horse-power. · 
Because of this discrepancy in their capacity the plaintiff refused to receive 
the engines at the freight house. He sued to recover his desposit. In a 
cross-complaint the defendant alleged that before he shipped the engines he 
told the plaintiff of the shortage of their capacity, but that the plaintiff said 
for him to ship them anyway. What finding of fact was made as to this 
allegation does not appear in the report. Judgment was given for the plain-
tiff on the ground of failure of consideration. Maho1iy v. Standard Gas 
Engine Co. (Cal., 1921), 202 Pac. 146. 
The genera1 rule is that when title has passed, if the chattel fails to come 
up to warranties the buyer's only remedy is an action for damages. Street 
v. Blay, ~ B. & Ad. 456; Lyoii v. Bertram, 20 How. (U. S.) 149; Crabtree 
v. Kile, 21 Ill. 18o; Hoover v. Sidener, 98 Ind. 290. But where a warranty 
is made with intent to defraud, and damage occurs, it is ground for rescis-
sion. ltfontgomery v. Bucyrus Mach. Works, 92 U. S. 257. Led by Massa-
chusetts, some jurisdictions hold: that in case of a "serious failure of consid-
eration" through breach of warranty the buyer can return the property and 
be freed from liability for the purchase price. Bryant v. lsburgh, 13 Gray 
607; Kuntzmait v. Weaver, 20 Pa. St. 422; Scranto1~ v. Tilley, 16 Texas 183; 
R1tby Carriage Co. v. Kremer, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 274 Although in the prin-
cipal case the language used by the court might indicate a tendency to follow 
the Massachusetts rule allowing rescission of sale for breach of warranty, 
the holding on the facts does not give sound support to this doctrine. If 
the court in fact made an unreported finding that the plaintiff asked that 
the machines be shipped after he knew of their defect, even the courts fol-
lowing the Massachusetts rule would have held that he thereby waived his 
right to return the chattel for that breach of warranty. Aultman-Taylor Co. 
v. Ridenour, ¢ Iowa1 638. If no such finding was made, the plaintiff merely 
recovered under the doctrine recognized alike by the courts that allow rescis-
sion and those that do not, that in the case of a tender of something different 
than called for by the executory contract of sale the buyer can reject what 
is tendered and recover any money he has paid in advance. Pope v. Allis, 
II5 U. S. 363. 
TAXATION-STOCK DIVIDI:NDS TAXABLE AS !NCOME.-In 1917, the com-
plainant stockholders in the Bronx Company received a "stock dividend" 
declared against appreciation of capital assets. Held, such "stock dividends" 
" 
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are taxable as a "receipt of income" under St. 1916, c. 26g. Tilton v. Trefry 
(Mass., 1921), 131 N. E. 219. 
We may assume, in the principal case, that a part of this appreciation 
occurred before the Income Tax Law was passed. Some cases take the 
view that earni~gs of a corporation do not become "income" to the stock• 
holders until paid to them, so the fact that any portion of the dividend was 
earned before the Tax Law went into effect would be immaterial. Van Dyke 
v. Milwaukee, 159 Wis. 460. There the court said, "As a stockho!der he 
acquired no right to it until it was distributed in the form of dividend. 
The profits of a corporation become income to stockholders when distrib-
uted as dividends, but not before." Accord, State v. Widule, 166 Wis. 48 
(dividends based on increased value of capital assets). The r~soning in 
the cases taking the contrary view seems more convincfog. In Lynch v. 
T1trrish, 236 Fed. 653, the court said, "They [stockholders] are the equitable 
and beneficial owners of all of its [corporation's] property,· and it is the 
mere holder and manager of it for them. * * * As against its stockholders, 
a corporation has no and they have all the beneficial interest in its property. 
* * * The enhanced value of the property which accrues from the gradual 
increase of its value during a series of years prior to the effective date of 
an income tax law, although divided or distributed by dividend or otherwise 
subsequent to that date, does not become income, gain, or profits taxable 
under such an act." Accord, Gray v. Darlington, 15 Wall. 63; Loomis v. 
Wattles, 266 Fed. 876 (stock dividends); Steveiis v. The Hudson Bay Co., 
25 T. L. R 709. The leading case tending to support the principal case is 
Tax Commissioner v. P1dnam, 227 Mass. 522, but there the "stock dividend" 
was declared against profits other than increased capital assets. State v. 
Widule, supra, is more direct authority supporting the principal case. In 
an opinion by Justice Holmes, ToW1ie v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, it was held 
that "stock dividends" were not "income." That case was followed in Eisner 
v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, where Justice Holmes dissented, basing his 
opinion on the belief that the sixteenth amendment to the Federal Consti-
tution was broad enough to include stock dividends as income. In Eisner 
v. Macomber the act of Congress was broad enough to include stock divi-
dends. Holmes cited Tax Commissioner v. Putnam, supra, with approval. 
The cases distinguishing "stock dividends" from "cash dividends" seem to 
have lacked convincing arguments to support the thesis that the former 
should be treated as a mere "distribution of capital" while the latter are 
to be regarded as "income." Compare Wall v. Londo1i & Provincial Tmst, 
Ltd. [1920] l Ch. 45; 2 Ch. 582. 
ToR'J.'S-LIABILlTY OF BAILOR OF AUTOMOBILE WITH D£F£cTivS STEERING 
GEAR TO INJURED THIRD PARTY...-D, the owner of an automobile, hired it to 
a bailee, who, while driving down a city street, ran into and injured P when 
the automobile became ungovernable due to a defective steering gear. By 
demurrer, D admitted that he negligently allo\ved bolts in the steering gear 
to become loose. Held, one who lets automobiles for hire "owes a duty to 
the public to the extent that he is bound to use ordinary care to see that 
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the automobile he lets to. be operated upon the public highways has its steer-
ing gear in a reasonably safe condition, as injuries to other persons lawfully 
using the highways are reasonably to be foreseen as the probable result of 
a defective steering gear." Collette v. Page (R. I., 1921), 114 Atl. 136. 
A manufacturer who is negligent in the manufacture of the articles he 
handles is not liable for his negligence to injured third parties who have no 
contractual relations with him. Winterbottom v. Wright, IO M. & W. 107; 
McCajfrey v. Mossberg Mfg. Co., 23 R. I. 381. Contra: Schubert v. Clark, 
49 Minn. 331. An exception to this general rule is that a manufacturer of 
an inheremly dangerous article owes a duty of care to all to whom it may 
come even in the absence of a contractual relation. Thomas v. Winchester, 
6 N. Y. 397. '!'he liability in such cases is not confined to manufacturers, 
but is placed also upon one who, without proper inspection, puts upon the 
market an inherently dangerous article. Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co., 
261 Fed. 878. '!'he principal case extends the analogy to the case of a bailor 
who bails an inherently dangerous article which injures a third party with 
whom the bailor had no contractual relations. '!'he Rhode Island court had 
previously held that an automobile is not an instrumentality dangerous per 
se, Colwell v . ..?Etna Bottle & Stopper Co., 33 R. I. 531; but now· qualifies 
that by holding that an automobile with a defective part so vital as the 
steering gear becomes inherently dangerous to other parties traveling on the 
highway. See Note 18, MrcH. L. R.Ev. 676. 
'!'RIAL PRACTicE-OFFicER's RETURN oN SUMMONS NOT CoNCLUSIVF..-
Plaintiff alleged that judgment by default was taken against him in a case 
in which he had no notice of the pendency of the action in any manner or 
form and that he had a good defense. '!'he sheriff's return stated that plain-
tiff had been served with summons. Held, a sheriff's return is not conclu-
sively true against a direct attack on a judgment where the defendant had 
no knowledge whatever of the pendency of the suit and where no rights of 
third parties are jeopardized. N1tttalburg Smokeless F11el Co. v. First 
National Bank (W. Va., 1921), 109 S. E. 766. 
'!'he common-law rule was that a sheriff's return was conclusive. A 
party injured by a false return had his only remedy in a suit against the 
sheriff making the false return. '!'he basis for the rule has been explained 
in various ways. It is sometimes said that the sheriff is a sworn officer to 
whom the law gives credit. Tillman v. Davis, 28 Ga. 494- If that is sound, 
then the law should give as much credit to his statement when suit is 
brought against him as it does when the return is attacked. Again, it is 
said that his sworn statement is a matter of record; but this reason is 
unsound because matters of record are often subject to be disproved. BIGE-
LOW, Es'tOPPEL (Ed. 6), p. 38. '!'he principal case explains it as follows : 
"When the verity rule was anciently formulated the sheriff was a high and 
important officer, the king's own representative, armed with the king's writ, 
and partaking of the king's fiction that he could do no wrong." '!'he rule 
"was followed by many states. including Virginia, without consideration of 
its reasonableness or its adaptability to changed conditions." '!'he most log. 
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ical explanation, however, is that advanced in 16 Cor,. L. ~v. 2537, where it 
is said that the action against the sheriff was given first and the common- _ 
law, being stingy of remedies, refused to give another by allowing the return 
to be attacked. In an excellent review of the cases in the various states the 
principal case points out that this common-law rule has been abandoned in 
twenty-one states, abolished by legislation in six others, and modified mate-
rially by the courts in seven others. Eight states, including West Virginia, 
still retain the rule. The common-law rule is clearly inequitable. If applied 
in the principal case, it would allow a plaintiff to retain $5,000 to which he 
was not entitled and make the sheriff liable to the defendant in like amount 
for serving process on a former president and shareholder of a corporation 
instead of the present president, to whom the former had sold out. The 
former West Virginia decisions, in upholding the rule, recognized it as a 
harsh rule, but said its harshness is "offset by the great inconvenience that 
would arise from uncertainty of judicial judgments and decrees" if any 
other rule were followed. Milling Co. v. Read, 76 W. Va. 557, 569. But 
Justice Lively, in the principal case, replies : "Experience,, the great practical 
test, has demonstrated that no harm to the stability and certainty of judg-
ments and decrees has resulted in the jurisdictions where the common-law 
rule of verity in the return has been abolished." It is gratifying to see a 
court take so progressive an attitude, and overruling its former decisions 
without waiting for legislation, abandon an inequitable rule founded upon 
no reasonable basis. For a complete discussion of this subject, see a leading 
article, entitled "Tm~ SH!UUFF's RE'ruRN,'' by Edson R. Sunderland, 16 Cor,. 
L. ~v. 2531, from which most of the material in the opinion in the principal 
case was obtained. 
TRIAI..s-RIGH't oF CouNsiu, ro QuESTION JURORS AS -ro THEIR IN'tr:RES'.L' 
IN LIABII,I'l'Y INSURANCE Co:MPANY.-In an action for damages for personal 
injuries the plaintiff's counsel examined the jurors on their voir dire, and 
asked them as to their business relations with surety or casualty companies. 
On appeal the defendant contended that this line of questioning was improper, 
since whether the defendant was insured was immaterial and prejudicial, 
and the e.-.;:amination was calculated to present this improper matter to the 
jury. Held, ,the questions were proper, since they were pertinent in deter-
mining whether the jurors were biased, and the case would not be reversed 
in the absence of a showing that counsel abused their privilege by making 
it a mere excuse to communicate improper matter. Wilso1i v. St. Joe Boom 
Co. (Idaho, 1921), 200 Pac. 884 
When the question whether an insurance company is interested in the 
action is presented directly by the examination of witnesses, it is clearly 
immaterial and prejudicial. This has been held prejudicial and reversible. 
although the trial judge sustained objections to the questions and instructed 
the jury to disregard the implications from such questions. Cosselman v. 
Dunfee, 172 N. Y. 507; Stratton v. Nichols Lmnber Co., 39 Wash. 323. 
Some courts hold it reversible error to introduce even a suggestion that an 
insurance company is interested in the suit by questioning jurors as to their 
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possible interest in such a company. Lipsch11tz v. Ross, 84 N. Y. Supp. 632; 
Hoyt v. J.E. Davis Mfg. Co., 98 N. Y. Supp. 1031; Swift v. Platte, 68 Kan. 
I; Schmidt v. Schalm, 2 Ohio App. 268; P11rcell v. Degenhardt, 202 Ill. App. • 
6u. On the other hand, a juror who is pecuniarily interested in the outcome 
of the suit is disqualified. McLaughlin v. Louisville Electric Light Co., 100 
Ky. 173. See 14 MICH. L. Rev. 161. So from this point of view it seems 
justifiable to permit questioning of jurors as to their interest in indemnity 
or liability companies as tending to show implied bias or as supplying 
information for peremptory challenges. Thus, where the attorney for the 
casualty company was present in court openly defending the action, it was 
held in Illinois that the jurors could be examined as to their relations with 
this company. Iroquois F1mzace Co. v. McCrea, 191 Ill. 340. Under similar 
circumstances the same result was reached in Indiana. Goff v. Kokomo 
Brass Works, 43 Ind. App. 642. One case takes the extreme view that there 
is no object in concealing from the jury the fact that an insurance company 
is interested in the suit, and if juries are influenced by such information to 
award larger recoveries such companies should provide for this increased 
liability in their contracts with the insured. M. O'Connor & Co. v. Gillaspy, 
170 Ind. 428. The principal case takes a middle ground and admits that the 
line of demarcation between proper and improper questioning is not clear, 
but depends upon the circumstances of each case. The examination is per-
missible when confined to the good faith purpose of determining the quali-
fications of jurors, and is objection_able only when, by :the assertion and 
repetition of facts unnecessary for this object, it is designed to introduce 
immaterial and prejudicial matter. This view seems sound,, and is foliowed 
by other cases. Faber v. Reiss Coal Co., 124 Wis. 554; Heydman v. Red 
Wing Brick Co., i12 Minn. 158; Williamson v. Hardy (Cal., 1920), 190 Pac. 
646; Williams-Echols Dry Goods Co. v. Wallace, 142 Ark 363. 
TRUSTS-R:eSULTING FROM PURCHASE WITH FUNDS OF GRANTEE AND WIFE. 
-P and D were the sole heirs of the latter's deceased wife. D had taken 
a conveyance to the land in question in his own name, $9.400 of the purchase 
price of $rn,400 being secured by the sale of the wife's lands. D afterward 
admitted that the land in question belonged to his wife. On a bill for dec-
laration of trust and partition, held, there was a resulting trust in favor of 
the wife to the extent of the part of the purchase price furnished! by her. 
Crawford v. Hurst (Ill., 1921), 132 N. E. 521. 
This case represents another example of a trust resulting from contri-
butions from several persons to the purchase price. A good many cases 
have tended to throw confusion into the subject by stating a requirement 
that the part paid must be an aliquot part of the 'entire purchase price. 
Furber v. Page, 143 Ill. 622. Just what is meant by aliquot part is by no 
means certain. The dictionaries indicate that it means a sum by which the 
entire purchase price may be divided without leaving a remainder. Such a 
meaning has been distinctly repudiated. In Fleming v. McHale, 47 Ill. 282, 
where the complainant had pa~d the first instalment, $300, on a total price 
of $1,08o, it was held that the aliquot part requirement was satisfied. In 
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Hinshaw v. Russell, zSo Ill. 235, it was held that "aliquot" meant a particular 
fraction of the purchase price as distinguished from a general contribution 
to the purchase money. Onasch v. Ziukel, 213 Ill. II9, was a case of general 
contributions of uncertain amounts, but the distinction was not made clear. 
It is submitted that the real requirement is that it must be certain how inuch 
of the purchase price was furnished by the person seeking to set up the 
resulting trust. Currence v. Ward, 43 W. Va. 367. In the instant case the 
aliquot part question was not considered at all, the court laying down the 
broad doctrine that where two or more persons advance the purchase price 
and the title is taken in the name of one, a trust results and each takes an 
undivided share in the equitable title proportionate to the amount advanced. 
For a similar development in Massachusetts, see l.1 cGowaii v. McGowan, 14 
Gray II9, and SkehilE v. Abbott, 184 Mass. 145· See l TIFFANY ON ~AL 
PROP$'l'Y, § 107; BoGER'l' ON TRUSTS, p. 105. 
